

RELEASE IN PART  
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**From:** H <hrod17@clintonemail.com>  
**Sent:** Sunday, October 28, 2012 3:03 PM  
**To:** 'hanleymr@state.gov'  
**Subject:** Re: 3:15 confirmed for Annan

Pls PUSH IT BACK. I cannot do it then. Tell ops I will call in when I can be connected.


----- Original Message -----

**From:** Hanley, Monica R [mailto:HanleyMR@state.gov]  
**Sent:** Sunday, October 28, 2012 03:01 PM Eastern Standard Time  
**To:** H  
**Subject:** 3:15 confirmed for Annan

This is the same sheet that Oscar printed for you.

The Secretary's Call Sheet for  
Former United Nations Secretary-General Kofi Annan

(SBU) Purpose of Call: Kofi Annan requested a follow-up call with you to discuss Russian Foreign Minister Lavrov's reaction to possible Syria strategies based on the principles outlined in the Geneva Action Group Communiqué. This call comes just days prior to Joint Special Representative Brahimi's October 28-29 trip to Moscow, where he will discuss the Geneva Communiqué as a way forward on a political transition in Syria. Deputy Secretary Burns spoke to Brahimi October 25 about his outreach to Russia. You spoke with Annan October 15 about your willingness to revisit the Geneva Communiqué as long as it launches a real political transition and includes consequences for non-compliance.



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(SBU) Background: Kofi Annan resigned from his position as the UN-Arab League Joint Special Envoy in August, blaming all parties, including the United States, for the failure of his mission, and also calling for Asad to step down. Though no longer formally involved on Syria, Brahimi remains in close touch and seeks advice from Annan, especially given the latter's close relationship with Russian Foreign Minister Lavrov. When Annan was the Joint Special Envoy, he frequently sought Brahimi's advice and insights on internal Syrian politics and regional dynamics. Both Annan and Brahimi appear to believe that it will be very difficult, if not impossible, for the UN mediation efforts to bear fruit, unless underpinned by strong support from both the United States and Russia. They also appear to believe that the differences between the United States and Russia are bridgeable and are trying to use their good offices to overcome them.

(SBU) Brahimi told us that during his recent trip to Damascus, Asad seemed to accept the proposition of moving elections forward to 2013 and might be persuaded to not contest them. Brahimi is also considering some of the proposals outlined in the Geneva communiqué for the management of the period leading up to elections and the subsequent transition. Brahimi does not intend to speak about this proposal publicly because he has not sufficiently consulted with the regime and the opposition. Prior to engaging in more detailed discussions with the Syrians on this idea, Brahimi wants to be assured of critical external support, particularly from the United States and Russia. If both the United States and Russia seem willing to pursue the ideas further, then Brahimi would like to explore the option of the United States and Russia sending high-level representatives to meet discretely with him in Cairo (or another location if they prefer) on November 3 or 4. If an understanding is reached with the United States and Russia, then he would begin consulting with the Syrians. Deputy Secretary Burns spoke with Brahimi on October 25.