

RELEASE IN PART
B5,B6

From: H <hrod17@clintonemail.com>
Sent: Thursday, January 26, 2012 5:37 PM
To: 'monica.hanley' [redacted]
Subject: Fw: Ashraf

B6

Pls print for me.

From: Mills, Cheryl D [mailto:MillsCD@state.gov]
Sent: Thursday, January 26, 2012 05:35 PM
To: H
Subject: FW: Ashraf

FYI

From: Fried, Daniel
Sent: Thursday, January 26, 2012 09:52 AM
To: Shapiro, Jeremy
Subject: RE: Ashraf

Thanks. I've already seen this e-mail and responded to it. I've also seen the lengthy back-and-forth on this subject between Zal and Kobler. If you send Zal's note to Jake, you should also tell him that I'm aware of it and have responded.

[redacted]

B5

From: Shapiro, Jeremy
Sent: Thursday, January 26, 2012 9:42 AM
To: Fried, Daniel
Subject: Fw: Ashraf

Dan,
Zal asked me to send the below to Jake Sullivan, which I did, but I thought you might also find it useful.
Best,
Jeremy

From: zal khalilzad [mailto:[redacted]]
Sent: Wednesday, January 25, 2012 05:28 PM
To: Shapiro, Jeremy
Subject: Ashraf

B6

This is the email I sent Jim Jeffrey. Thanks

Thanks. On Ashraf, I believe it needs your urgent attention. You and Martin Kobler did a superb job to avert a crisis and a possible use of force which could have caused many lives to be lost. However, we are heading towards a new crisis now. I believe this for the following reasons:

1. Camp Liberty is 66,000 square meters with trailers for almost 6,000 people and very little else in terms of facilities. This camp is conceived of as a transit camp--implying that the residents will be there for a short time before being resettled in other countries.
2. But re-settlement is shaping up to be complicated. I have talked to the leadership of UNHCR, which believes at present the Europeans are unwilling to take any significant number of residents. In fact, UNHCR reports that France is actively lobbying other Europeans against taking Ashraf residents as it believes many even if initially sent elsewhere will end up in Paris where MEK leaders are based. UNHCR reports that at present only the Australians are willing to take a small number.
3. Minimal space at Liberty would be tolerable if the residents had freedom of movement while there. But under the present plan they will not be able to leave and return to camp freely (i.e. they will be confined there).

Therefore, very soon the residents would be confront two untenable options: (1) refuse to move from Ashraf to Liberty and risk an Iraqi assault on Ashraf; or (2) acquiesce to move into a situation that perhaps might be more like a prison than a refugee facility--especially when you compare it to Ashraf. I know that at times MEK leaders have made unreasonable demands, but their poor past performance should not cause us to still try our best to avoid the genuinely undesirable consequences of the two scenarios described above.

If resettlement to other countries cannot be expedited and large numbers stay for a long time, I see three options worthy of consideration:

1. Get the Iraqis to allocate more land for Liberty in order to allow for the building of support facilities by residents thus allowing the circumstances to become tolerable for them.
2. Use Liberty only as a transit location in the following manner: have 400 residents move from Ashraf to Liberty and to be processed by UNHCR. Once those processed are resettled, the next 400 residents would move from Ashraf to Liberty and the same process is repeated until all residents are resettled.
3. Get the GOI to allow freedom of movement for Liberty residents. A small camp might be more tolerable and therefore acceptable to the residents if they have freedom of movement going in and out of the camp as they wish and are not confined within.

Among the three options, in my judgment option 2 has the most merit as it might be easiest. The movement of the first 400 from Ashraf to Liberty can start very quickly. The Iraqi government can claim success as movement of residents starts and the process for closing Ashraf does, too. Option three might be the most difficult. Maliki is very unlikely to grant freedom of movement to the residents because he is likely to be concerned that the residents might well conspire with his Iraqi opponents. This option is not without risk for the residents, as well. But the option has support in UNHCR in part because it believes in such a scenario the residents will find their own paths to resettlement or dispersal. Option 1 falls somewhere in between. It is the cleanest option, but I cannot judge with confidence whether Maliki would agree to grant more land for Liberty.

As far as accelerating resettlement is concerned, I know there are differences of view on how many residents will opt to go to Iran. In my judgment, it is prudent to assume that under normal circumstances the number is likely to be small. Given that and given Europe's strong reluctance to accept Ashraf residents for resettlement, to accelerate the resettlement process we might consider the following: The US announces that it in principle it is willing to accept 300 qualified residents for resettlement in the US provided others do their share and pushes for a conference of key countries where qualified residents could be resettled. Such a conference would be chaired by UNHCR and would encourage other pledges to be made. I believe UNHCR would welcome such an initiative. Of course, if we accelerate resettlement it would have implications on options with regards to the

camp as discussed earlier.

Regards