

RELEASE IN FULL

**From:** Mills, Cheryl D <MillsCD@state.gov>  
**Sent:** Friday, August 10, 2012 8:07 AM  
**To:** H  
**Subject:** Fw: OIG inspection of Embassy Nairobi and Somalia Unit  
**Attachments:** Embassy Nairobi redacted ISP-I-12-38A.pdf

**From:** Kennedy, Patrick F  
**Sent:** Friday, August 10, 2012 08:01 AM  
**To:** Mills, Cheryl D  
**Cc:** Carson, Johnnie; Thomas-Greenfield, Linda(MS); Nuland, Victoria J; Hammer, Michael A  
**Subject:** FW: OIG inspection of Embassy Nairobi and Somalia Unit

The "Inspection of Embassy Nairobi, Kenya (Report Number ISP-I-12-38A, August 2012)" will be put up on the OIG web site some time Friday morning, WDC time

Included in the *Embassy Nairobi* report are the following key findings [Edited by PK to list only those relevant to Amb.]:

- The Ambassador has lost the respect and confidence of the staff to lead the mission. Of more than 80 chiefs of mission inspected in recent cycles, the Ambassador ranked last for interpersonal relations, next to last on both managerial skill and attention to morale, and third from last in his overall scores from surveys of mission members. The inspectors found no reason to question these assessments; the Ambassador's leadership to date has been divisive and ineffective.
- The Ambassador has damaged the cohesion of Embassy Nairobi's country team by underscoring differences between offices working directly with Kenya and those with regional responsibilities. Country team members, particularly those from other agencies, relied on the recently departed deputy chief of mission to maintain a sense of common purpose at Embassy Nairobi. Unless corrected there is a risk that the country team will become dysfunctional. The Ambassador needs to broaden his understanding of why various agencies are part of his mission, cease avoiding contact with them, and work with the assistance of a senior Department of State (Department) official and the next deputy chief of mission to restore country team harmony.
- The Ambassador's efforts to develop and focus the mission's work around what he calls "mission essential tasks" have consumed considerable staff time and produced documents of unclear status and almost no value to the Department in approving priorities and assigning resources. His efforts have also created confusion about the relevance of the embassy's annual Mission Resource Request (MRR). The Office of Inspector General (OIG) team agreed with embassy staff that the mission essential task process added no real value to the management of the embassy.
- The Ambassador's greatest weakness is his reluctance to accept clear-cut U.S. Government decisions. He made clear his disagreement with Washington policy decisions and directives concerning the safe-havening in Nairobi of families of Department employees who volunteered to serve in extreme hardship posts; the creation of a freestanding Somalia Unit; and the nonuse of commercial email for official government business, including Sensitive But Unclassified information. Notwithstanding his talk about the importance of mission staff doing the right thing, the Ambassador by deed or word has encouraged it to do the opposite.
- The Ambassador does not read classified front channel messages and has not established a system to have his staff screen incoming cables relevant to Kenya and U.S. interests in the region.

- The Ambassador's initiative to redirect programming for nearly \$550 million in U.S. health assistance, while well intentioned, has proven disruptive and created confusion about its relationship to existing programs. He announced to the Kenyans the establishment of a new unfunded program, called Let's Live, with the unrealistic aim of reducing by 50 percent in 1 year Kenya's premature mortality rates for infants, mothers, and non-communicable diseases.

- The embassy needs to focus the political section's reporting on the forthcoming March 2013 elections and should draw from a 1-year strategy recently approved by Washington, which includes a plan to engage the Kenyan public and authorities to prevent and mitigate ethnic-political conflict.
- The respective responsibilities of Embassy Nairobi and the Somalia Unit are clear in principle, but in practice the Ambassador has set a tone that discourages collaboration between the embassy and the Somalia Unit.
- Embassy Nairobi's public diplomacy efforts would be strengthened if there were better internal communication and coordination among agencies to publicize U.S. assistance efforts in Kenya. The Ambassador should be a more integral part of the mission's public affairs strategy and activities.

There were some redactions to the posted report.