

**From:** Anne-Marie Slaughter <[REDACTED]>  
**Sent:** Wednesday, February 1, 2012 12:40 PM  
**To:** H  
**Cc:** Abedin, Huma; Cheryl Mills; Jacob J Sullivan (SullivanJJ@state.gov)  
**Subject:** a possible new approach to Iran

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Jake and Sheba,

Again following up on our conversation re Iran, I have just seen a report by a group of smart Princeton seniors under the guidance of Frank von Hippel [REDACTED] and one of the world authorities on non-proliferation; he and Bob Einhorn taught a seminar on that subject at Princeton for years) AND [REDACTED] who was the Iranian nuclear negotiator until a year ago. [REDACTED] still has lots of contacts, of course, and has thought v hard about this issue, particularly the question of how to lock the Iranians into actual negotiations. I reprint the (3 paragraph) Executive Summary of the report below: it's innovation is a PHASED grand agenda that would be agreed to at the outset, as well as a way of lifting sanctions that is reversible and politically doable (at least relative to other options). I have sent the whole report to S/P and the students themselves (with their advisers) are presenting the report to Bob Einhorn on Friday at State, but I thought you should just see the quick outline of their approach.

Best,  
AM

#### Executive Summary

A decade after its uranium enrichment efforts were publicly revealed, Iran's nuclear program inches closer to a breakout weapons capability. If a nuclear-armed Iran were to emerge, regional dynamics could make containment difficult. We judge, therefore, that the primary U.S. objective should be to prevent Iran from acquiring nuclear weapons by extending Iran's breakout time in the short term, while simultaneously reducing Iran's motivation to obtain nuclear weapons in the long term.

An evaluation of the different strategies that have been proposed for responding to Iran's nuclear challenge, including the United States' current dual-track policy, targeted military action, and regime change, suggests that none is able to simultaneously achieve the short and long-term objectives listed above. Direct bilateral negotiations offer the best chance of success, but only if new attempts can avoid past failures and address the broader motivations behind Iran's nuclear program.

We propose a notional framework that we call a Phased Grand Agenda (PGA), which, in addition to addressing the nuclear issue, would contend with the smallest set of related non-nuclear issues upon which a peaceful resolution of Iran's nuclear ambitions depends. Negotiations would proceed in a set of phases, with each stage building confidence to allow for deeper cooperation in the next. The most urgent actions, such as freezing Iran's enrichment of uranium to levels below 5%, would be taken first, while the most difficult steps would come last. To minimize the temptation for either side to end implementation of an agreement before completing the entire PGA, reversibility for the two sides would be matched in each phase.

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