

<b>RELEASE IN PART</b> <b>B5</b>
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**From:** Sullivan, Jacob J <SullivanJJ@state.gov>  
**Sent:** Friday, August 26, 2011 5:13 PM  
**To:** H  
**Subject:** Fw: Update

FYI - trying for more info on the CW report

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**From:** Miller, Andrew P  
**Sent:** Friday, August 26, 2011 03:21 PM  
**To:** Sullivan, Jacob J; Harrell, Peter E; Shapiro, Jeremy  
**Subject:** Update

Please see update and note below. Thanks.

#### Battlefront

- Heavy fighting continues in Tripoli's southern suburbs and the area adjacent to the airport. No major shifts in past 24 hours.
- Mutassim plans to reinforce Khamis, whose forces are running low on ammunition and weapons, in southern Tripoli in preparation for assault on city center. Supply line through Bani Walid remains open for this purpose.
- Rebels are continually reinforcing their positions in Tripoli, drawing from a multitude of militias.
- Regime forces transferring armor and artillery to Sirte to bolster defenses. The Brits have conducted several airstrikes on the city.
- Fighting in Zawara and Sebha remains intense.
- First possible CW-related movement reported.

#### Whereabouts

- Number of reports on Q today, but can't assess their reliability. Possible locations: southern Tripoli, large farms on outskirts of Tripoli, Sirte, and Bani Walid.
- Report that Saif in Bani Walid, but can't confirm.
- Mutassim and Saadi in Sirte.
- Khamis in southern Tripoli.
- Q daughter, Aisha, still trying to get out.

#### Internal

-Police are refusing to return to their posts in Tripoli; insecurity is rampant.

-Jibril has tasked a TNC commander with mobilizing a rebel force that excludes LIFG elements. He reported that Bel Hajj is not cooperating with his combined operations center and wants to develop a military capacity independent of his militia.

-The water supply in Tripoli is dangerously low as access to the Great Manmade River has been suspended.

#### International

-South Africa succeeded in preventing the AU summit from recognizing the TNC, although a number of individual African states did so anyway.


-Jibril is interested in a non-military UN police mission in Tripoli, without which he doubts the TNC will be able to stabilize Tripoli. He is receptive to Jordanian assistance.

-Salabi and Bel Hajj, on the other hand, are rejecting any international security presence in Libya. Salabi reported to the Qataris that he and Bel Hajj would violently resist any such deployment. The Qataris are trying to walk them back from this position.

#### Note

Jibril's interest in forming a military force independent of Bel Hajj's influence is understandable, but threatens to escalate internal conflict within the rebel forces. There are two risks:

- Both sides are positioning themselves for a post-Q order, but, while tensions have clearly increased, they continue to step back from the brink in the interest of achieving their common objective of Q's defeat. Each step of this kind brings the rebels closer to abandoning even the pretense of unity. At some point, and it could come sooner than later, the breaking point will be reached and open conflict may occur within rebel ranks. This would be disastrous, giving Q the strategic blunder he would need to salvage his position.
- Even if the rebels hold it together until Q's capture or death, the articulation of distinct militias with little coordination between them could turn Libya into a mini-Lebanon. In this scenario, Libya's reconstruction and stabilization could be set back years, regardless of which side triumphs in the end.



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