

RELEASE IN PART B6
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**From:** sbwhoep [redacted]  
**Sent:** Thursday, September 1, 2011 1:09 PM  
**To:** H  
**Subject:** H: Latest intel, NTC/army/relations allies/China. Sid  
**Attachments:** hrc memo intel NTC army, allies & China 090111.docx; hrc memo intel NTC army, allies & China 090111.docx

B6

CONFIDENTIAL

September 1, 2011

For: Hillary  
From: Sid  
Re: NTC, its army, allies, & China

As of the morning of September 1, 2011, a source with excellent access to the highest levels of the Libyan National Transitional Council (NTC) and the National Liberation Army (NLA) stated in confidence that one of the greatest challenges facing the new government of Libya is the increasing self reliance of the regional and tribal militias that make up the bulk of the NLA. The NLA commanders, including Generals Khalifa Haftar and Mohammed Suleiman, believe that the upcoming siege of Muammar al Qaddafi's traditional stronghold at the city of Sirte affords them the opportunity to increase the level of coordination among these individual units. The NLA commanders are aware of the fact that while the centralized NLA forces continue to struggle with battlefield coordination, medical care, and matters of logistics, the smaller militia units have become better organized as individual commands. As the NLA attempts to wind up resistance in Tripoli and moves toward Sirte they are concerned that these units are beginning to compete with each other to be in position to take the greatest share of credit for final victory.

The NLA commanders are attempting to deal with a disparity in the level of logistical support from unit to unit. Those militia units that are based in Benghazi and other relatively prosperous areas have been able to improve their support to the units drawn from their regions. At the same time, units arising from the poorer, rural parts of the country have suffered from shortages of food and ammunition. Extremely sensitive sources note that medical care is limited and unreliable throughout the NLA.

(Source Comment: The NLA commanders are also concerned that their allies in NATO continue to worry about the presence of members of the Muslim Brotherhood in various NLA units. They are monitoring the activities of these individuals to guard against attempts by radical Islamist groups within the Brotherhood to press for an

Islamic state in Libya. NLA security officers believe that these Libyan Brothers receive support from the Moslem Brotherhood in Egypt, and that this support will only increase as the Brotherhood plays an increasingly important role in the new Egyptian political structure that is developing after the fall of former President Hosni Mubarak.)

These knowledgeable sources add that the leaders of the regional militias in the NLA are already maneuvering for positions of authority in the new NTC government, based on their service in the rebellion. At the same time, Prime Minister Mahmud Jabil, President Mustafa Abdel Jalil, vice President Abdul Hafiz Ghoza, and the other more traditional leaders of the NTC are working to obtain support from NATO and its constituent members. At the same time, they remain highly suspicious of the relationships that the governments of Italy and Germany maintained with the Qaddafi regime, particularly Qaddafi's son Saif al-Islam Qaddafi.

(Source Comment: Jabil and the other NTC leaders are highly suspicious of the efforts of China and Russia to establish increased economic contact with the new Libyan government, believing that these relationships will not work to their advantage. This is particularly true in the case of China. The NTC's contacts in Africa have warned them that while the Chinese appear to be interesting partners, they are very aggressive in exploiting natural resources, and that the relationships end up being very one sided in favor of China. )