

RELEASE IN PART
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From: sbwhoeop@[redacted]
Sent: Tuesday, April 12, 2011 4:24 PM
To: H
Subject: H: Zuma and Q's new Bealrus mercs. Sid
Attachments: hrc memo Zuma's sham offer and bribes; Q hiring Belarus mercs 041211.docx; hrc memo Zuma's sham offer and bribes; Q hiring Belarus mercs 041211.docx

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CONFIDENTIAL

April 12, 2011

For: Hillary
 From: Sid
 Re: Zuma's sham offer and bribes; Q hiring Belarus mercs

Latest report:

During the morning of April 12, 2011, sources with access to the Military Committee of the National Libyan Council (NLC) stated in confidence that their contacts in the Organization of African Unity (OAU) gave them advance information on the ceasefire plan put forth by South African President Jacob Zuma during his visit to Tripoli and Benghazi in early April 2011. Armed with this information the NLC was prepared for Zuma's offer, which they characterized as Muammar Qaddafi offering to allow them to surrender. In their discussions in Benghazi Zuma warned that Qaddafi has not used all of the military resources at his disposal, and that NATO, and the United States could not be trusted to support an African nation for any extended period of time. As reported in the press, the rebels rejected this offer out of hand, a decision that was made easier, in the opinion of a knowledgeable source, by increased NATO air attacks against Libyan Army forces fighting at Ajdabya.

(Source Comment: According to knowledgeable individuals, NLC officials also believe that like many OAU heads of state, Zuma has accepted substantial secret financial support from Qaddafi. They add that the Libya dictator is now calling in these favors to gain international support for his regime. At the same time, Western intelligence sources add that Zuma believes strongly that it would be a mistake to set a precedent for allowing protestors/rebels to replace a sitting head of state. While South Africa has democratic elections and Zuma remains popular with a large portion of the South African population, his government has been plagued by allegations of corruption and other criminal activity. According to these sources, Zuma worries that these accusations will spark a protest movement that could endanger his government, particularly if they can look to Libya and other countries in North Africa as examples of where these movements succeeded.

(Source Comment: These sources noted that Zuma was frustrated by his negative reception in Benghazi, but believes that he helped improve Qaddafi's image in the eyes of the World.)

During the evening of April 11 European supporters of the NLC stated in confidence that Qaddafi, working through established military contacts in Eastern Europe, hired a new contingent of mercenaries from Belarus. These 200-400 troops are former members of the elite 334th regiment of the Belarus army. This force is considered by the rebels to be far more dangerous than the mercenaries from Chad, Algeria and other African countries used by the Libyans in the past. They are experts with the Soviet weapons that make up much of the Libyan arsenal and according to knowledgeable individuals the Libyans are interested in their expertise in using advanced, long range weapons systems, particularly artillery. Qaddafi and his military commanders see these forces as a way to offset NATO air strikes.

(Source Comment: Knowledgeable sources add that as many as 3,000 former members of the Belarus armed forces are negotiating to work as "free-lance" contractors for a number of North African Governments.)

According to sources with access to the NLC (also known as the Transitional National Council), the ruling council is functioning as the government of Eastern Libyan, and includes the following individuals:

- Moustapha Abdul Jalil, Head of Council (Former minister of Justice);
 - Terbil FATHI (Lawyer known as a defender of human rights);
 - Ahmed Abou El (Bank);
 - Mohammed Fathi Baja (Political science professor);
 - Salwa Bougaghis (Legal expert);
 - Ali Aziz el Eisawi (Former ambassador to India and former minister of economics);
 - Mahmoud Jibril (A long time associate of Saif al-Islam Qaddafi);
 - Omar Hariri (A long time associate of Qaddafi. He participated in the 1969 coup against King Idriss. He later fell out with Qaddafi and served a long prison sentence.)
- the putsch in 1969);
- Abdel Younus el Obeid, General (until 20 February Interior minister).

On August 10, a source with access to the advisors of Saif al-Islam Qaddafi reported in confidence on the structure of the Libyan security forces.

According to these individuals, Muammar Qaddafi commands between 15,000 and 30,000 troops. They are trained and well equipped; recruited in large part from the "ghou" clan of the Qaddafha tribe (from the region of Sirte). These forces are personally loyal to the Qaddafi family and make up units such as the 32nd brigade, commanded by the Libyan leader's, Khamis.

(Source Comment: Qaddafi's personal body guard has been reinforced by a small contingent of Serbian Mercenaries, recruited in the same effort that introduced Belarus forces into the Army.)

By the same token, these knowledgeable individuals state that the rebel forces suffer from a chaotic chain of command, untrained troops, and political bickering inside of the NLC. That said, approximately 6,000 former Libyan army soldiers deserted to the insurgents; these include:

A battalion of elite troops who followed Younus when he defected. They are personally loyal to him and follow his orders only.

Civilian volunteers from Beida and Derna (where the Muslim Brotherhood is in well entrenched). These volunteers include a significant number of Muslim Brotherhood supporters.

The following information was provided by an extremely sensitive source during early April 2011:

THE OFFENSIVE POTENTIAL OF THE LIBYAN ARMY

1. Weapons of Mass destruction: Nuclear, Biological, and Chemical

Nuclear:

No longer active, although military sources in Libya state that Qaddafi stored some artillery shells loaded with Derivatives of Yellow-cake in southern Libya, probably in the area GHAT.

Biological

No longer active.

Chemical:

Limited to an uncertain number of artillery shells loaded with mustard gas, and intended for destruction in accordance with international agreements. (Source Comment: The destruction of these stocks was not carried out before the rebellion began.)

2. Conventional Weapons; in addition to the individual AK47 assault rifles have: machine guns, RPGs, and GPZ:

- T64 and T72 tanks,
- Soviet self-propelled 155 mm,
- Troops transport vehicles such as BMP,
- System AA ZSU 23/2 and 23/4,
- Man-Portable Air Defense System (manpad) missile type SAM7, • Missile c/a Family SAM5,

- Counter tanks missiles; Spigott,
- Soviet machine gun 12.7mm,