

RELEASE IN PART  
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**From:** Samuel Berger [redacted]  
**Sent:** Saturday, August 28, 2010 5:30 PM  
**To:** H  
**Cc:** Samuel Berger  
**Attachments:** Principles\_Design\_Working Draft.pdf; Principles\_Design\_Working Draft.pdf

HRC: I am attaching a matrix of prior language that has been used in connection with the major Israeli-Palestinian issues.

It was prepared in the context of language the US might use if it were to articulate principles, not principles to which the parties might agree, but it provides most of the language that has been used in the past, with citations.

The USIP Middle East group Steve and I chair decided that rather than issue a static report, we would prepare/commission a series of timely and specific papers that we would provide privately to the Administration. (I have sent some of those to your office). They include papers on security, Palestinian institution building, public attitudes in Israel and the territories, etc.

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I will deliver a set of those papers to your office on Monday

If it would be useful, I would be happy to convene a small, private discussion with some of the sharpest people in the group, or give you some names.

A few observations following up our call this am.:

- (1) This (a Framework Agreement) is very difficult but I don't think impossible. If Bibi can say he has secured unprecedented commitments on security and established the principle of a Jewish state, he could decide to play the historic leader. If he is uncompromising, he will have to deal with the consequences for US-Israeli relations. His opt out, of course, is to blame the Pals, but we will be "in the room".
- (2) I think this should be a negotiation that goes from principle to paper rather than the other way around, i.e. not an early exchange of documents that dig each side into its positions. The two leaders need to feel each other out first at the level of first principles, to be distilled after a period by the U.S.
- (3) Not sure we need to be in every meeting.. Ultimately, they need to establish some trust. But we (you or Mitchell) need to be present enough to make sure that there is no misunderstanding of what has been agreed, and to move things along. .
- (4) On the critical issue of security, I don't think the Israelis any more trust NATO to stand firm. They will expect an IDF presence in the Jordan Valley for some time. Palestinians recognize that there will be a transitional phase. Question is how long.
- (5) As you know, Abbas' position is crumbling. Based on my conversation with him when he was here recently, I think he is genuinely committed to an agreement. He hopes that, if this fails, Bibi will seem to be unreasonable. And in that event, I expect he will resign. His minimal requirement is the equivalent of 1967.

This is all tricky business, but I don't think we have a responsible choice not to make this effort. It is the highest form of statesmanship for you to try.

I am leaving on Monday for some foreign travel but can be reached through my office -- Laura Huber [redacted]

Sandy