

RELEASE IN PART
B6

From: sbwhoeop [redacted]
Sent: Thursday, August 26, 2010 10:02 AM
To: H
Subject: Re: In case you missed, and see last graph. Sid

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Maybe. And, of course, worth the effort. Without an effort, the two state solution is dead; if failed, on the other hand, also dead. Another idea, don't know if it can be made to work: How to introduce Israel entering the NPT and ending its nuclear ambiguity, which is its state policy, but which itself is the model for Iran now. Can this issue be used profitably in negotiations, a wild card, as it were? Can options be developed on whether it can, how it might work, potential effect on peace process? Israel's nuclear ambiguity policy is certainly a big issue coming given Iran. See below from Haaretz today:

[redacted]

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Interview / Why Israel should end its policy of nuclear ambiguity

An interview with Avner Cohen, expert on nonproliferation issues and author of the forthcoming book "The Worst-Kept Secret: Israel's Bargain with the Bomb."

By [Natalia Mozgovaya](#) Tags: [Israel news](#)

Avner Cohen is a senior fellow of the James Martin Center for Nonproliferation Studies at the Monterey Institute of International Studies. He is the author of "Israel and the Bomb" and the forthcoming "The Worst-Kept Secret: Israel's Bargain with the Bomb."

Avner Cohen, you claim that the time has come for Israel to abandon its policy of nuclear ambiguity. Why now, and why would that be good for Israel?

"Nuclear ambiguity is a cornerstone of Israeli strategic thinking. It was born many years ago, and sealed as part of a comprehensive deal with the United States in 1969. It was appropriate at the time, but today, in my opinion, it is not just anachronistic, but foolish and anti-democratic. Even in realpolitik terms, it is an 'own goal' for Israel. In my view, it undermines genuine Israeli interests, including the need to gain recognition and legitimacy and to be counted among the responsible states in this strategic field."

Are you sure the pressure on Israel is so severe? If Israel is criticized over its nuclear program, it's usually marginal. The brunt of the criticism is over its treatment of the Palestinians.

"Israel received tacit consent for its nuclear program from the Western world because it appeared to be a small, just state surrounded by enemies, and the memory of the Holocaust was still fresh. Israel's image was different then.

"In the long term, the more Israel appears to reject peace and to be the one that opposes a two-state solution, the more it will be perceived as a regional bully that possesses nuclear weapons. So the world will be a lot less forgiving on the nuclear issue. The situation of ambiguity, in which you don't have real legitimacy, is not a good place to be."

The United States has called on Israel to join the nonproliferation treaty, but during Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu's visit to Washington, U.S. President Barack Obama said he recognizes the special nature of the threats Israel faces, and these threats warrant special security measures.

"The Americans want to appear just and fair because the issue is seen in Israel as completely sacred. They want to look as though they respect that. This agreement [with the U.S.] has been passed along from president to president, but I don't believe this issue is as sacred to Americans as it is to Israelis."

Do you give credence to the slippery slope theory, under which abandoning ambiguity would lead to demands that Israel disarm?

"Those are cliches used by the defense establishment. Nobody demands that Israel make such an announcement without first doing the preparatory work among its allies and the Arab states. This great fear of a slippery slope is ridiculous. Israel has its own interests; nobody can coerce it to do things."

What about the claim that ambiguity is what keeps the Arab states from feeling a need to launch an arms race against Israel?

"I don't dismiss that claim out of hand, and if, after study and thought, this fear turns out to be warranted, I would be prepared to wait. But in some ways, ambiguity is insulting to the Arabs. The claim you mention treats Arabs as though they were children: If they are told that Israel doesn't admit to it, that frees them of the need to deal with the reality. I believe the Arab countries don't want to play a game of make-believe, but rather want to discuss the topic directly and realistically."

You say, basically, that Iran is imitating Israel's nuclear behavior. That comparison would certainly rankle Israel supporters.

"But the way Iran has advanced toward nuclear capability is not via announcements and tests, but rather by rumors. It can even remain within the bounds of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty. If that rankles anybody, let it rankle."

"If Iran is not attacked, it will want to achieve a status of ambiguity; I see this as nearly certain. The international community thus has another reason not to accept the idea of ambiguity as legitimate. The norm that a state with a nuclear weapon must say so clearly is part of the nonproliferation regime. The longer Iran continues down this path, the less patience the world will have for Israel."

How do you envision the scenario of 'coming out of the nuclear closet'?

"Censorship plays a very central role in the enforcement of nuclear ambiguity. So long as there is a [military] censor, it is very hard to alter ambiguity. If censorship didn't exist, Israeli newspapers would be able to write about the subject more openly."

"Another issue is the need for a law that addresses the nuclear topic. There is a Shin Bet [security service] law, but there is no law for the Mossad and no law for the Israel Atomic Energy Commission. This is a very problematic situation."

"On the international level, it's a sensitive subject that demands preparatory work. Ultimately, I see a political statement by Israel's government in which the prime minister would find the right way to put this subject on the table. He would talk about the historical background and the responsible way Israel has dealt with this topic. With a few rare exceptions, these weapons have no military use; Israel views them as a means of deterrence. I don't think Israel would need to go into detail regarding how many [bombs] it has or exactly what it has."

"Israel has a right to the bomb no less than New Delhi, or even the United States. Ambiguity creates a sense that we are sinners, as though we had done something so terrible that we can't tell the awful truth - and I don't think it is so awful. This is a country that the world has viewed as a nuclear state for a long time, and the time has come for it to say something positive on this huge, complicated and awe-inspiring topic..."

"All these states are ultimately committed under the treaty they signed to achieve a world without nuclear weapons. Whether that will happen in our lifetimes I can't say."

You say ambiguity undermines Israeli democracy and prevents debate on matters of life and death, such as the question of whose finger will be on the button. Do you think the Israeli public is ready for such a discussion?

"There has been very little creative thinking in this area, and ambiguity is one of the stifling factors that have produced an unacceptable, closed culture incapable of creative thinking. Ambiguity's power derives from the fact that Israeli society accepts it, and it seems to the public that any attempt to deviate from it would cause serious damage to Israeli security."

"Ambiguity has created a public incapable of dealing with the topic, one that is afraid of it and prefers the issue to be handled by 'trustworthy hands' so that it does not have to take responsibility itself."

"Ambiguity has created an ignorant, craven public which, in a certain sense, has betrayed its civic, democratic duties on this subject."

What's it like researching a topic nobody discusses?


"When I started studying this subject 25 years ago, I had the feeling I was entering a palace where nothing could be touched. It took me years to find the right way to handle the topic responsibly - from a researcher's perspective, not from the standpoint of someone who is directly involved in the matter."

"Today I think it is possible to initiate a meaningful dialogue about concrete, real issues."

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This story is by:

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-----Original Message-----

From: H <HDR22@clintonemail.com>

To:

Sent: Thu, Aug 26, 2010 9:45 am

Subject: Re: In case you missed, and see last graph.

Well, this may be a case of no good options, but I still believe it is better to

be caught trying. Stay tuned...

----- Original Message -----

From:

To: H

Sent: Thu Aug 26 09:04:36 2010

Subject: In case you missed, and see last graph. Sid

H: In case you missed this, by the FT international affairs editor, esp the last

graph. Sid

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Financial Times FT.com <<http://FT.com/>>

A poisoned process holds little hope

By David Gardner

Published: August 25 2010 22:46 | Last updated: August 25 2010 22:46

As the caravans of Middle East peace negotiators rumble into Washington next week for the umpteenth time, the pervasive cynicism and sense of deja vu all over again is overwhelming - and with good reason.

The Middle East peace process long ago turned into a tortured charade of pure process while events on the ground - in particular the relentless and strategic Israeli colonisation of occupied Palestinian land - pull in the opposite direction to peace. "We have all been colluding in a gigantic confidence trick," is how one Arab minister puts it, "and here we go again."

While many factors had combined to hand veto powers to rejectionists on both sides, the heart of the question remains the continuing Israeli occupation. It is essential to remember that the biggest single increase of Jewish settlers on Arab land - a 50 per cent rise - took place in 1992-96 under the governments of peace-makers Yitzhak Rabin and Shimon Peres at the high-water mark of the Oslo peace accords. Many Israelis will point to the perfidy of the late Yassir Arafat, who wanted to talk peace but keep the option of armed resistance

dangerously in play. But what killed Oslo was the occupation. The second intifada that erupted a decade ago was essentially the Oslo war.

A decade on, the Israeli settlement enterprise has turned the occupied West Bank into a discontinuous scattering of cantons, walled in by a security barrier built on yet more annexed Arab land and criss-crossed by segregated Israeli roads linking the settlements. Last month, B'Tselem, the Israeli human rights group, published a study showing Israel has now taken 42 per cent of the West Bank, with 300,000 settlers there and another 200,000 in East Jerusalem. The siege of Gaza has turned that sliver of land into a vast, open-air prison. The main feature of the present situation is the disconnect between the high politics of the utterly discredited peace process and these - in Israeli parlance - "facts on the ground".

At last month's White House summit, where Barack Obama and Benjamin Netanyahu massaged their long estrangement into a political armistice, the US president praised the Israeli prime minister as a leader "willing to take risks for peace".

But there is no evidence for this whatsoever. True, in June last year, in response to Mr Obama's Cairo speech denying any legitimacy to Israel's settlements, Mr Netanyahu forced himself to utter the words "Palestinian state" - but he surrounded them with barbed-wire caveats that voided them of meaning. Indeed, the words all sides use - peace, resolution, security, and so on - may

be the same; but what each side means by them is different.

The mainstream Palestinian leaders, President Mahmoud Abbas and Salam Fayyad, the prime minister, and the Quartet made up of the US, the European Union, the UN and Russia, talk of a negotiated resolution. This means two states living in peace and security, and a Palestinian homeland on the 22 per cent of Mandate Palestine taken by Israel in the 1967 Arab-Israeli war. East Jerusalem would serve as the capital of the West Bank and Gaza, with marginal land swaps to preserve some Israeli settlements near Jerusalem. But what does Mr Netanyahu mean?

He has been most clear on what he does not mean. For a start, he has set his face against any concessions on Jerusalem. He wants to keep most settlements except for the far-flung "ideological" ones and the 100-plus "outposts" established as pawns to be traded once the chess game began. His idea of a demilitarised Palestinian state is more like a sort of supra-municipal administration than a self-determined, independent government.

Will he surprise us, on the hackneyed Nixon and China principle that holds it is politicians of the right who most easily close difficult deals? There is little to suggest that.

The thinking of Mr Netanyahu, son of a celebrated promoter of Greater Israel, has always been profoundly irredentist. While his nationalist Likud faces the constraints of being in coalition with an assortment of ultra-rightist and

ultra-orthodox parties as well as Labour, that was plainly his choice; the centrist Kadima party was (and remains) an alternative. To be fair, Israel's electoral system - with a low threshold for entry into the Knesset that makes multi-party coalitions inevitable - means lobbies such as the settlers can take the national interest hostage. But Mr Netanyahu magnifies this by his choice of partners and by diligently firing up the ultra-hawks in the pro-Israel lobby in the US.

As risks he has taken for peace, Exhibit A is the much-hyped moratorium on settlement-building, which expires next month and has, in any case, been speciously interpreted. While the bulldozers to build settlements have been idling, moreover, the bulldozers demolishing Palestinian homes have been roaring: the rate of demolition in and around Jerusalem has doubled this year, while the army has just razed the village of al-Farisiye in the Jordan Valley, in line with Mr Netanyahu's strategically obsolete obsession with keeping the valley as Israel's eastern border.

As diplomacy struggles to keep alive the viability of a two-state solution, three rival systems of control have crystallised in the occupied territories that would make up a future Palestinian homeland: the settlements; the crimped Palestinian Authority of Mr Abbas and Mr Fayyad; and then Hamas, which Israel and its Arab and western allies have tried and failed to marginalise. Time is short for a negotiated outcome; it may even have run out.

The outlines of a deal are clear, in the (Bill) Clinton parameters of 2000 and Arab Peace Initiative of 2002, endorsed by 22 Arab and 57 Muslim countries (as well as Hamas, as part of the 2007 Mecca accord). There has to be an end to the occupation, and the US and Quartet cannot just allude to this; they must demand it.

The writer is international affairs editor

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