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**From:** Sullivan, Jacob J <SullivanJJ@state.gov>  
**Sent:** Monday, July 19, 2010 8:41 AM  
**To:** H  
**Cc:** Abedin, Huma  
**Subject:** TPs

Below are points for the press on the plane. I'll have a hard copy printed:

First major ministerial in Afghanistan since the 1970s. The very fact of it is a big deal.

Context is important. This is not out of the blue, it's not just a random gathering; it's part of a systematic process: Karzai's inauguration, announcement of the President's strategy, London conference, Peace Jirga, and now the Kabul conference.

Increasing Afghan leadership and ownership: They are presenting a set of concrete programs on governance, service delivery, security transition, economic development, and reintegration. These programs are detailed; they are serious; and they reflect months of work and consultation.

Increasing international alignment: The international community is coordinating with each other - through ISAF, Sedwill, de Mistura, etc. - and aligning its efforts with the Afghan programs and priorities being set forth at this conference. This is NOT a pledging conference. It is an opportunity to ensure we are effectively supporting Afghan government leadership and ownership

Follow-through and accountability: In his inauguration, Karzai laid out a credible vision; in London, the Afghan government committed to developing and pursuing specific plans in a variety of areas; at Kabul, we'll be heavily focused on implementation. This is about mutual accountability for the pledges made and the programs set forth.

July 2011: The president's strategy reflects both urgency and resolve: increased resources and intensity in our efforts to take the fight to the enemy and to build Afghan capacity to effect a conditions-based transition; and a long-term civilian commitment to support Afghanistan long into the future.

Clear strategy: Reverse the momentum of the Taliban; build the capacity of Afghan security forces; and as Afghans develop the capability to stabilize their country, we must draw down our combat presence and make a responsible transition to Afghan leadership.

Clear desired end-state: An Afghan state that is willing and strong enough to ensure that global terrorists never again have safe haven within its borders; can withstand internal and external threats; and can continue to make long-term political and economic progress, all with sustainable levels of international support.

Civ-mil cooperation: Unfortunate to lose General McChrystal, but maintained continuity with General Petraeus and we have only intensified our civ-mil engagement both in Kabul and Washington.

Reconciliation: Stress that it is Afghan-led. Note red-lines.