

**From:** H <hrod17@clintonemail.com>  
**Sent:** Sunday, October 4, 2009 5:17 PM  
**To:** 'S Berger [redacted]  
**Subject:** Re: [redacted]

Thanks, Sandy. This is very helpful.

----- Original Message -----

**From:** Berger, Samuel R. [redacted]

**To:** H

**Cc:** Berger, Samuel R. [redacted]

**Sent:** Sat Oct 03 23:54:07 2009

**Subject:**

HRC: I wasn't satisfied by my answer to your question about how to gain leverage over the Pakistanis to move them to more aggressively pursue AQ. I've thought about it some more and, while I have no silver bullet, here are some further thoughts.

-- My impression is that the Pakistanis have been more cooperative lately in assisting us target some AQ in Pakistan and that, where they hold back, it is less a function of affinity toward AQ and more about with whom AQ is imbedded..

-- In particular, they seem to be more reluctant to target AQ where it is nestled with groups they want to cultivate in the event we "leave" Afghanistan and they need influence there. They have seen that before and will hedge their bets.

-- So the first point is that we have to address the reason why they are holding back. If we can disabuse them of the perception that we are leaving Afghanistan, it will be easier to get the Pakistanis to go after AQ in sanctuaries provided by groups which would be part of a future Afghanistan dominated by the Taliban.

-- Second, I believe that coercive measures are more likely to be effective if they are targeted against military leaders who give support to AQ and its allies. Assuming we have adequate intelligence, we can go after bank accounts, travel and other reachable assets of individual Pakistani officers, raising the stakes for those supporting the militants without creating an inordinate backlash. Blunter measures of coercion, like conditioning our assistance, are more likely to be counterproductive. Given the level of distrust for us among the Pakistani people, they would see this as another sharp swing of the U.S. pendulum which would harden their attitudes and make greater cooperation very difficult for the Pakistani people to accept.

-- There may be greater leverage in giving the Pakistanis incentives to be more aggressive. Of course, the military's calculation is most important. I'm not sure what is on their shopping list these days but we would need to balance what would move the needle on AQ against undercutting our effort to get them to shift their strategic focus away from India. At the same time, we can be as forward leaning as possible in support of their counterinsurgency capabilities (equipment, training, whatever material, intelligence and other assistance we can give them if they move into Waziristan -- including relief for displaced persons). If they finally take that step, we can do all that is possible to demonstrate that our arrows are aligned with theirs..

-- On the civilian side, their desire for greater control over how Kerry-Lugar money can be used can be played to our strategic advantage. If we give them a greater sense that they are directing the use of these funds -- without greatly undercutting their effectiveness -- it strengthens our position to press them on AQ.

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-- Finally, there is the defining relationship with India. Are there measures that the Indians could take that would reduce Pakistani anxieties about the Indian front and thus better enable them to focus on threats to the East, including both AQ and anti-Indian militant groups like LET? Are there confidence building measures such as information sharing on troop movements that would both reduce uncertainty and support a Pakistani public narrative for a shift in emphasis from India to the militancy? To the extent India seeks to have Pakistan move more vigorously against the militants, they could see such steps as advancing their interests. This is tricky territory but may be worth pursuing.

Sandy