

**RELEASE
IN PART B6**

From: H <hrod17@clintonemail.com>
Sent: Tuesday, September 15, 2009 6:34 AM
To: 'cheryl.mills' [redacted]
Cc: 'toivnf@state.gov'
Subject: Re: Branch Summary

Pls give me printed copy today.

----- Original Message -----

From: Cheryl Mills [redacted]
To: H
Sent: Wed Sep 09 21:23:22 2009
Subject: Branch Summary

See below. Will send PIR comments shortly.

To: CDM
Fr: Caitlin
Re: Branch Book

Overview:

There are few surprises in this book. The "surprises" that might exist are buried and took a close reading to pick up on—the two main ones are about the terror clause of WJC's crime bill and why he hadn't disclosed information about Lewinsky (because he hadn't wanted to become a witness against her). There are a lot of things that have been covered in My Life and other publications. Quite honestly the book was pretty boring and much more focused on Branch than I had anticipated. While not as "and this day, and the next day" as My Life, it does share many of the same elements that would engage only a true Clinton fanatic or historian. The fact that there appears to be no index also makes it difficult for anyone looking for a quick hit to get one. Furthermore, WJC's words are so interlaced with Branch's recollection through his dictations, that the number of direct WJC quotes was far fewer than I had expected.

HRC was not as much of a player as one might imagine. Her role is largely seen through her interactions with Branch when he is recording WJC. Her statements were consistent with the past, with the exception of the Gephardt comment, and didn't grab much attention at all.[1] (Others included HRC's devotion to CVC, thought that there should not be a special prosecutor and images of her returning from meetings. They were pretty much aligned with her interactions with Branch.) Surprisingly, or not surprisingly, many of the problems discussed in the book are those, which face the current Administration—Middle East peace, North Korea, China, etc...

Branch repeatedly injects his feelings on specific subjects and seems to use the book to voice his own opinion of the Administration and events of the time. He clearly has topics he prefers over others (for example his connection with the events in Haiti result in a lot of discussion about it), but there are some subjects that are strikingly sparsely discussed such as Rwanda. Its absence from long discussions was surprising, but it did not appear as though WJC ever dodged questions about the topic, they just weren't addressed. Much like *My Life*, one theme that repeated itself was WJC's conflict with and disdain for the media, especially long passages about NYT and Washington Post. There are a few instances where he gives them credit on their reporting, but you would be hard-pressed to find them. Additionally, there are numerous mentions of WJC's acute allergies and his chronic fatigue, with imagery of him falling asleep in sessions on more than a couple occasions.

The book has quite a bit on Whitewater, but given the dearth of public documentation there is little that Branch could write that hadn't been said. One thing I had not recalled was the D'Amato's subpoena of CVC's friends, later quashed, who slept over while HRC's Rose Law Firm records were in the White House. Branch does portray a helpful distinction in how WJC looked at Whitewater and other scandals. While WJC attacks Whitewater as a political hunt, Branch does have him WJC saying that Filegate needed to be separated from Whitewater, because this was a legitimate inquiry. There are some quips that could catch someone's eye, such as WJC referring to Paula Jones as "a 'new bimbo' he [WJC] didn't even recognize."

Branch does not dwell on Lewinsky or the impeachment. With the exception of Bruce, Bennett and Kendall, no other lawyers are mentioned. There is one passage that I am looking into, in which WJC says part of the reason he didn't mention his relationship with Lewinsky at first was because she was being threatened with jail time if she was found to be lying under oath and had he told the truth he could become a witness against her. This is a very small passage that could easily be missed, but one that it is important to note as I don't recall hearing this before. (This is addressed more fully below.)

There are a few relationships that track through the book more than others. They include WJC's relationship with Gore, which maps in part because it is not a focal point until the end, and his contentious relationship with Janet Reno. The one Senator that appears to be most discussed negatively is Moynihan. All three of these issues are discussed in turn below. WJC is portrayed as an extremely loving and attentive father and HRC is portrayed in a much more human light than other books/articles covering this time period, with ample mention of her relationship with CVC and images of affection between her and WJC, both pre- and post-impeachment.

On foreign relations there is a lot of time spent discussing the Middle East, Northern Ireland, the Balkans, China, Russia, Pakistan/India and in the beginning of the book, Haiti. (Note: Much of what is written about Haiti is about Branch's own experience there and on the subject.) There is also a fair amount of discussion about North Korea, but nothing that has not been discussed in the past few weeks. Bin Laden is discussed in what seems to track mention of him in *My Life*, which seems to have more detail and background than this book.

In certain cases there is more detail here than in *My Life*, for example on his trip to Pakistan WJC wrote that the USSS cancelled one stop because they would be "defenseless" flying in, whereas Branch writes that the streets would be lined

with "assassins." There are candid looks at WJC's take on certain people and the relationship between some, such as Albright and Berger's dislike of Holbrooke, and a more detailed depiction of Yeltsin's drinking, such as yelling outside of Blair House for a cab to get pizza.

One thing to note, is that often times WJC seems to be speaking to Branch intentionally without the recorders going, but Branch writes about those interactions and exchanges nonetheless. Such is the case with HRC's Gephardt comment.

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Wen Ho Lee and Terror Clause of Crime Bill

In discussing Wen Ho Lee's release Branch characterizes WJC's lack of knowledge about the strained interpretation of the anti-terrorist provisions in the crime bill and arbitrary detentions as a "confession." My Life only mentions Lee's accusation in passing and does not again discuss Lee. Below are two passages from Branch's book the first giving context and the second about the Terror Clause of the Crime Bill.

∅ The year closed on spies and terrorism. The Justice Department, after fierce debate among the security agencies, indicted nuclear scientist Wen Ho Lee on fifty-nine counts of copying classified material to his personal computer. Lee was being handled like a radioactive espionage defendant—no bail, lockdown, solitary confinement—even though the long dragnet had produced no evidence that he offered secrets to China or anyone else. The president said experts were telling him the worst spies sometimes stored their treason for a rainy day. This sounded fishy to me. Clinton shrugged. Nothing would please him more than to establish Lee's innocence. [Branch, 577]

∅ While Lee was indicted, Branch writes that WJC noted that others "were being held in secret, uncharged and untried...He [WJC] was embarrassed not to have sponsored this measure into law without foreseeing such arbitrary detentions...Under the terrorist act, any prosecutor should decide within the legal limit...whether to bring charges on the testimony of a secret informant or otherwise. To his dismay, Clinton had learned of defendants held incommunicado for more than six months. One extreme detention had last three years. 'I think it's wrong,' he [WJC] said. 'It's not American. We accept guilty people on the street to enjoy and protect our freedom.'" [Branch, 629]

WJC and Lewinsky's Silence

Branch writes that part of WJC's motive for not discussing what had happened with Lewinsky was that it could send her to jail, as she had denied it.

∅ "Also, he pointed out that Starr had been threatening to jail Lewinsky all year over her sworn denial of the affair. If Clinton had come forward with anything at all about their relationship, he said Starr could have turned him into a witness against Lewinsky, betraying her discreet silence. Such subtleties, while original, struck me as tendentious. The president never claimed chivalry as the real motive for his steadfast denial, nor did he dispute the essential truth of Lewinsky's account." [Branch, 511]

HRC and Kissinger

The following could be fodder for people who want to continue to string along the notion of channeling Eleanor Roosevelt.

∅ There is a passage in which HRC describes an exchange she had with Kissinger at a dinner where he complained that if the health care bill passed he wouldn't be able to see his own doctor. She continued to say "it was interesting, in fact, that she had dreamed about Kissinger only a few nights before. His visage turned suddenly effervescent at a banquet, announcing gladly that his worries were over because the Clinton health care bill was dying. 'Oh, no, Dr. Kissinger,' she replied coolly. 'Don't be sure that it's dead. We'll keep fighting, and there's always light at the end of the tunnel.' She said Kissinger blanched, speechless at her deft reminder of the Vietnam War...Now at last, in Hillary's dream, it registered that his strategic designs had spewed carnage and venom for seven needless years...'That's what I dreamed,' Hillary repeated, lost in thought. 'You know, I always get my revenge in dreams, but never in real life.'" [Branch, 179]

HRC and gay/lesbian

Writing about a call with HRC from NYS, Branch recalls how WJC's counsel got very "exercised." WJC left the room. "He was subdued on his return. 'You know, I've had a lot more contact with gay people in my life than Hillary.' He sighed. Her temperament had a conservative, religious core, formed before homosexual issues were even mentionable. New York politics was a tough crucible, and she was unsure what heat she could take. On the other hand, personal experience could speed adaptation." [Branch, 551]

Tension with Moynihan

There are several occasions throughout the book that Branch recalls WJC's grievances and frustration with Moynihan. For example:

∅ When Moynihan called for the international arms embargo to be unilaterally lifted so that Bosnia could fight for themselves, Branch writes, "The president flinched when I mentioned [it]...'That's just a freebie for him,' snapped Clinton, 'and he knows it.'" [p.140]

∅ In regard to health care: "Echoing comments by Hillary at dinner, he [WJC] faulted Senator Moynihan for aimless hearings conducted without a strategy or theme." [p.170]

∅ Discussing Independent Counsel: "She [HRC] was especially scornful of the Democrats, and quoted a number of them. Senator Moynihan, for instance, publicly said the Clintons were nice people and he was sure they had nothing to hide. 'Why not have an investigation?' he often asked. She said Moynihan skated blithely on the surface, never produced results in Congress, and could not withstand such scrutiny himself for five minutes, living in an apartment secured through his chairmanship of the Pennsylvania Avenue Development Corporation." [Branch, 182]

∅ "Donnybrook" argument in which Moynihan said of a fundraising speech WJC gave citing a regretted hypothetical about a controversial decision. Moynihan told the press, "He doesn't understand...that he's conceding the principles." WJC confronted him about lack of context given to the statement to the press and said that Moynihan knew what he was doing by "feeding the beast of hostile presumption about Clinton's motives." [Branch, 299]

HRC as World Player

There are several images as HRC as a player on the world stage, both with WJC and on her own. Several examples follow:

∅ Middle East: Discussing peace with King Hussein: "They had retreated for lunch as two couples—the Clintons, with the king and his wife, Queen Noor—in the family dining room...Their agenda was a delicate race between Hussein's failing health and his desire to make peace with Israel. The president said he and Hillary pounded away on symptoms of national estrangement: closed borders, water disputes, travel barriers, war grievances, contested airspace, sealed electrical grids, and so on. Hussein gave them a feast of goodwill without commitment on any point." [Branch, 170]

∅ South Asia: Regarding her trip to South Asia with CVC in 1995, "Her [HRC's] schedule was far more demanding than ceremonial, pushing both conflict resolution and civic empowerment for downtrodden women." [Branch, 236] Later Branch tells of Benazir Bhutto praising CVC and HRC. "By contrast with a superficial American press, which portrayed Hillary as a demure tourist of no policy significance in exotic Asia, Bhutto said she had touched essential political chords with whirlwind encouragements for citizenship groups and small-scale economic development." (The note contrasting Bhutto corresponds to a NYT article which Branch quotes in the footer saying, "she [HRC] played the traditional role of First Lady as wife and mother...") [Branch, 246]

∅ China Speech: Branch outlines how HRC felt the speech needed to be bigger than China and how she depicted the "harsh reality everywhere" from China to Africa. He then cites WJC commenting on the rave reviews of HRC's speech. [Branch, 289]

∅ Regarding the Russian financial system meltdown, Branch writes "Yeltsin seemed so removed from urgent political tasks that both Clintons counseled him directly." [Branch, 512-513]

Jesse Jackson

Branch writes about Jesse Jackson calling CVC after the Lewinsky story broke and having continued contact with her throughout the period. WJC thanks him for his support of CVC. This goes into some detail about WJC's gratitude, but the fact that Jackson "counseled" CVC has been public knowledge dating back to at least 1999.

∅ "But now Jesse had done something he would not forget: When the Lewinsky news broke, he called Chelsea at Stanford. Jesse was the only nonfamily adult with her cell phone number. How he got it was another story. Jesse said he knew this was terrible for her. Nothing like it had ever happened in American politics. He did not know everything involved, but he wanted to remind Chelsea how much her parents loved her. Their family needed to stick together now above all, and if she needed to counsel, rage, or pray, he was always available." [Branch, 497]

Tension with Janet Reno

Throughout the book, from his nomination of her, WJC is portrayed as having no opinion to having a negative opinion of Janet Reno.

Ø “He complained about Janet Reno—made it clear, in fact, that he felt alienated from his own attorney general. If he removed her, however, the pending decision on yet another special prosecutor [for 1996 campaign finance] would fall to Reno’s deputy, Jamie Gorelick, who, Clinton feared, may share Reno’s wholesale devotion to outside control for any case in which the president himself may become a target...If he removed both Reno and Gorelick, to start fresh, it would touch off a firestorm of protest like Nixon’s Saturday Night Massacre of the Justice Department officials during the Watergate scandal. That was not an option.” [Branch, 388-389]

Ø Branch writes about WJC talking about Reno and Louis Freeh disregarding a letter from D’Amato and continuing to allow independent counsel to go after Ciseneros. The same held true for Mike Espy. Branch then outlines a meeting between WJC and Reno. Reno had made public statements about her “desire to stay on the job. ‘I told her I didn’t like that one damn bit,’ the president said tersely. ‘I didn’t hire her to work for the New York Times and Washington Post. I hired her to work for me.’” [Branch, 398] He continues to outline that Clinton did give Reno credit for some good achievements including coordination with U.S. attorneys and that he didn’t blame her for the special prosecutor on Whitewater, but that “he did blame her for abdicating responsibility to supervise the investigations ever since, letting mandates multiply almost at will. She accepted criteria that were ludicrous and crassly partisan. Reno had failed to defend the presidency itself—not Clinton personally, but the institution—and by extension the entire executive branch...He told me she had no clue what he meant. His advisers considered her more naïve than upright, and the fuzziness of the distinction seemed to save her.” [Branch, 399] He cites that Clinton warned her that she should prepare herself for not staying in the job for the entire second term.

Portrayal of Jimmy Carter

There are parallels that could be drawn between WJC/BHO and Carter/WJC both in terms of Carter’s trip to North Korea and the mission he went on to Haiti. WJC clearly was frustrated by Carter’s seeming desire to be on the front lines.

North Korea:

Ø “On North Korea, he [WJC] said Jimmy Carter had initiated his own recent trip with a call to Al Gore, and Clinton had approved the volunteer mission to break through North Korea’s extreme isolation...Sure enough, Carter did reach North Korean dictator Kim Il-sung, who proposed to allow inspection of North Korea’s nuclear facilities in exchange for relief from the harsh economic sanctions. The only hitch was that Carter announced the terms on CNN before they became official, adding gratuitously that he never had agreed with sanctions in the first place. News stories had the White House seething, but Clinton made light of the spat. He said the deal was since ratified by an exchange of letters, and he did not believe Carter would criticize official policy ‘if the game were still in doubt.’” [Branch, 162]

Haiti:

Ø After pushing to be sent to Haiti and enlisting Colin Powell and Sam Nunn to get WJC to break with Gore (who said Carter shouldn't be trusted a second time) and Christopher and approve the mission to Haiti to seek a truce with the junta, Carter is portrayed as acting stubbornly and having 'clientitis' (arguing for acceptance of Haitian generals versus what was in the United States' best interest). He didn't want to leave and WJC told him he had to. Like after North Korea, Carter again, Carter went to the press first. "The three negotiators flew back to Washington late Sunday, and Carter, invited to stay over at the White House, called CNN's Judy Woodruff after midnight to arrange an interview the next morning before he reported to Clinton on his mission. This conduct, the president said tersely, was not right...The press was full of retrospective stories about friction between him and his three prominent negotiators...He said the current newsweeklies lapped up criticism by Carter as an embarrassment to Clinton...Many of his advisers griped that Jimmy Carter thought he was still president, but Clinton found this criticism too jaundiced. Carter had spoken with restraint at their joint press conference, he allowed, exhibiting a keen political ear...To Clinton, Carter simply felt that he had earned the right to speak his mind as an international statesman, even about a mission he had accepted for the United States government complete with an Air Force jet. This sense of entitlement could make Carter a thorn, but Clinton thought his value far outweighed the political annoyance. He considered Carter a sterling ex-resident." [Branch, 200-201]

Dispatch of Bombers Near Iraq

Ø "He expected military strikes to win bipartisan assent, including former presidents Ford, Reagan and Bush. 'Dole will support me,' he said. 'Carter will probably criticize me. Carter always criticizes, but he doesn't have much positive to say.'" [Branch, 518]

Gore

For the majority of the book, there is little discussion of WJC and Gore's relationship. There are few places where he is briefly mentioned and a couple of scenes with some levity. The end, however, describes the seemingly brutally candid conversation between the two about the 2000 election and the impeachment.

Ø On page 92 Branch writes, "No, he [Clinton] did not ask Gore to take over a failed foreign policy, as alleged, but to improve public presentations by his troika of 'bad talkers': shy National Security Adviser Tony Lake, boring Secretary of State Warren Christopher, and disorganized Defense Secretary Les Aspin." [Branch, 92]

Ø In one-passage WJC talks about asking Gore to lead the independent review of Hazel O'Leary and also having Gore substitute for him at an economic conference in Japan. The latter did not fare well as other nations were offended that Gore, not WJC attended. Gore insisted that WJC needed to go to Japan to redeem himself and the administration for his absence. Gore pointed to a few days in January, but WJC "pronounced them vital to Chelsea's schoolwork. Gore blinked. So what?...Mutual exasperation spiked. 'Al,' Clinton told him, 'I am not going to Japan and leave Chelsea by herself to take these exams.' Gore erupted. He thought Clinton had lost his bearing. They had a big fight, said the president, and were still wrangling about dates for Japan." Branch states that this fight wound up being around the time WJC saw Lewinsky. [Branch, 316-317]

Ø On page 396-397 there is a scene, which shows Gore's sense of humor and Gore, WJC, et al working as a team to secure the Cabinet for the second term.

Ø Later there is a passage about an exchange between WJC and HRC about Gore trying to hire a second criminal lawyer. HRC already knew he was paying the first one \$30,000 per month. The conversation is about a leak of an offer from Jim Neal of TN, the former Watergate prosecutor to defend Gore for free. The exchange is more on ethics of the offer and its leak to the press than about Gore.

Ø On Gore's announcing his campaign. "The president had called twice to congratulate Gore for his kickoff events—once from Geneva, hours later from Paris. Clinton thought the only glitches were technical...But Gore got all the big things right. His twofold message was perfect: distinguish himself from Clinton's personal flaws, and tell voters exactly what he would do for them in the White House. The president said it was fine for Gore to call Clinton's affair with Monica Lewinsky 'inexcusable.' First, it was true. Second, it showed a necessary strength to criticized the boss. Third, Gore would be badgered to death until he did. 'Al,' Clinton told him, 'if you thought it would help in the campaign, I would let you flog me at noon right on the doorstep of the Washington Post.'" [Branch, 553-554] Branch continues that WJC told Gore to ignore reporting that he was offended or critical of his campaign. "On tape, the president said he confided his chief strategic worry only to Gore himself and to Gore's pollster, Mark Penn. The vice president must project his platform—where he stood, precisely how and where he would lead the country—because the Republicans would try to knock him off substance." [Branch, 554]

Ø WJC offered critiques of Gore's campaign throughout, but it was always framed as his fear of Gore not succeeding him. For example, "Clinton still thought Gore could win. Most people considered him smart, experience, and motivated. He examined the pitfalls for Gore in a campaign showcasing presidential character over detailed agendas for the country. Reporters called Gore "stiff," but Clinton discounted this liability. He thought Gore's droll sense of humor would wear well over time. Gore also was perceived to be too conventional a Democrat, therefore lacking independence, which called for Gore to emphasize more his own passion and initiatives. Then the president said Gore could have a brooding quality about him, not worrisome or off-putting in itself, but potentially damaging if his serious nature failed to give voters a lifted. Clinton isolated the word "sunny." Gore needed more of it." [Branch, 599]

Ø He also complimented Gore's knowledge of government workings. "Gore knew Washington. Believe me, said the president, his administration would have made many more errors in the first two years had it not been for the vice president." He then goes on to say that WJC suggested Gore find someone who would be a bright spot to run with, perhaps Durbin or Bradley or Kerrey, although he also goes into great detail about the virtues of Mikulski, even though she would never get chosen. How much of this was WJC's emphasis versus Branch's focus on his home state senator is unclear. [Branch, 599, 618-19]

Ø WJC criticized Gore for not running on the successes of the administration. "They should be running essentially for a third term, said the president, but they were afraid the Clinton-Gore record would tarnish them with Clinton's character." [Branch, 623] Branch gives WJC's critique of Gore in debate that had been heard before—that Gore lacked style and a light touch.

Ø Branch has WJC recalling a conversation between WJC and Gore where "Gore had bared himself in one of their stressful consultations by insisting that he, Gore, was a good politician, elaborating that he meant good on the policy, and also good on the politics, but admitted that he did not instinctively blend the two. Gore said he had to think about it, and Clinton thought this was pretty close to the bone...He had the stuff to be a great president, and this was the message that Clinton must convey somehow without seeming to brag on his own record." [Branch, 623-624]

Ø The big passage about Gore begins on page 641 and extends to 645. Branch notes that WJC was unsure at first about recording the details. At the outset it says, "For his own part, Gore was not angry, nor did he blame Clinton for his defeat, but he wanted to acknowledge forthrightly that some people around him did." [Branch, 642] It has WJC acknowledging that Gore's use of him was proper—he was best in the White House. Then he says, "'I think you made a mistake not to use me more in the last ten days,'" Clinton told Gore, 'but otherwise that was not a big deal. I was much more upset about your message, now that we're being honest.'" [Branch, 642] Branch recalls WJC saying Gore fought back saying that "Clinton's drag plagued every direction." Clinton then said that Gore was better at governance than Clinton, and Gore would be better for the nation than Bush, and that he was an "unparalleled" vice president, but that he had "blind spots." Branch writes that WJC kept saying their confrontation was "surreal."

o Gore had a "fresh grievance...he wanted Clinton to know that the Buddhist temple fund-raising scandal had been the worst experience of his life. No one had ever questioned his personal integrity, but corrosive publicity and whispers had tormented him now for four years. Gore said he had not been disposed to blame Clinton. However, he remembered telling the president that he found himself the only English-speaking person at one of those Asian fund-raisers. And the president was in charge of the party apparatus that was supposed to screen all the donations for trouble. So he did blame Clinton in a way. The president told me he could scarcely believe the ensuing tales of suspicion. Gore must still be in shock from the election, or unhinged. 'I thought he was in Neverland,' he said." [Branch, 643-644]

o Branch continues: "The vice president asked Clinton about Monica Lewinsky. He had supported Clinton all through the impeachment, publicly and privately, while declaring himself disappointed. Yes, said the president. He appreciated that. However, persisted Gore, Clinton did not confide any personal feelings. He never explained exactly what happened. There was little to say, Clinton replied, beyond failure and regret. He was humiliated and angry, had made mistake. He had misled the American people, and he was sorry. Gore closed his point with emphasis. Well, he said, this is the first time you have apologized to me personally. Clinton did a double take...Gore treated the confession as a watershed. Their colliding perspectives made both of them angry. Clinton exploded that Gore's reaction was phony. What was so significant here?...Gore exploded back. He was feeling a stubborn repeat of the defensiveness and delayed honesty that somehow cost the election. Clinton's character was at the root of it..." [Branch, 644-45]

Other

Ø Maggie as Person Recommending Panetta: Unlike in *My Life*, in Branch's book, it has WJC asking Maggie to compile confidential suggestions for McLarty's replacement. "Williams was shrewd, discreet, and efficient." [Branch, 161]

Ø HRC and Haiti Invasion: Branch asked WJC what HRC thought about his foreign policy team's suggestion to invade Haiti. "He said the pell-mell rush to invade was crazy to her. Reacting against the pressure, the lack of options, and his

sense of being trapped, she said he was badly served by his foreign policy staff. He said she observed with some suspicion that the chief sponsors of the invasion—Lake, Berger, and Talbott—were the same people who had pushed the ill-fated appointment of Bobby Ray Inman as defense secretary.” [Branch, 189]

Ø ITAV: ITAV co-author flap in which Sally Quinn spread rumors that HRC had not written the book. Quinn said that HRC had denied credit to the book’s collaborator, Barbara Feinman, a friend of Quinn. HRC said Feinman had withdrawn from the project. Branch notes that the White House had draft chapters in HRC’s handwriting. (Branch turned this to be about him and how it affected him as a ghostwriter.) From this HRC said that Quinn and her friends launched a rumor that HRC and a female veterinarian of Socks’ were “discovered...in flagrante on a bedroom floor in the White House.” [Branch, 342-343]

Ø Subpoenas of CVC’s Friends: Branch tells of how D’Amato, as Chair of the Banking Committee, had subpoenaed all those who might have been in the White House when HRC’s Rose firm records were there. This included “some two dozen of Chelsea’s sleepovers.” Senator Sarbanes quashed the subpoenas for the sleepovers. [Branch, 362]

Ø Vernon Jordan Extramarital Sex: In the context of Lewinsky, Branch says of Vernon Jordan, “In our glancing associations, I had picked up from Vernon an attitude toward extramarital sex best described as lighthearted or recreational.” [Branch, 495]

Ø Gore/HRC ticket: “By the numbers, and Clinton’s gut, a Gore-Hillary ticket would give Democrats their best chance to defeat Bush for the White House. ‘Hands down,’ he [WJC] said, ‘but I don’t think Al would ever do it.’” [Branch, 540]

Ø WJC suggesting Rubin run for NY Senate seat: The passage comes after WJC talks about supporting HRC if she decided to run, which raises a question of whether he had preferred Rubin or whether the two events are unconnected. “When the president had urged him [Rubin] to run for and easily win the New York Senate seat, Rubin recoiled...He could not fathom why Hillary wanted to run now...” [Branch, 557]

Ø On trip to South Asia: Branch says that WJC agreed to cancel a stop in Bangladesh, because “of hard intelligence that Osama bin Laden had lined the route with assassins.” [Branch, 594] My Life discusses the cancelled trip but does not specify it was because of bin Laden or assassins.

[1] ""Gephardt is an asshole," Hillary commented. The president, pointing to my recorders, advised gently that the tapes were on. She winced but shrugged with a smile. "Well, he is," she insisted. In an awkward silence, I backed up both machines to erase the first lady's epithet." [Branch, 263]