

RELEASE IN  
PART B6

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**From:** H <hrod17@clintonemail.com>  
**Sent:** Wednesday, July 4, 2012 7:54 AM  
**To:** 'sullivanjj@state.gov'  
**Subject:** Fw: H: Libyan elections intel. Sid  
**Attachments:** hrc memo libyan elections intel 070312.docx

More info.

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**From:** [REDACTED]  
**Sent:** Tuesday, July 03, 2012 07:08 PM  
**To:** H  
**Subject:** H: Libyan elections intel. Sid

B6

CONFIDENTIAL

July 3, 2012

For: Hillary  
From: Sid  
Re: Libyan election

**SOURCE:** Sources with direct access to the Libyan National Transitional Council, as well as the highest levels of European Governments, and Western Intelligence and security services.

1. Libyan National Transitional Council (NTC) President Mustafa Abdel Jalil expected the final days leading to the July 7, 2012 national elections to be complicated and sometimes violent; however, according to a knowledgeable individual, he is particularly concerned by the level of control exerted by regional militia's and political groups on the electoral process. In the opinion of this individual, Jalil and his advisors believe that, given the level of suspicion and frustration felt in the various parts of the country, it will be difficult for the new 200 seat General National Congress (GNC) to establish its authority, draft a new constitution, and establish new national government. With this in mind, Jalil stated in extreme confidence that the NTC may have to remain in power until the situation becomes stable and a new government is firmly in place. That said he still plans to have interim Prime Minister Abdel Rahman el-Keib step down after the election results have been certified. The NTC will then work with the GNC as it takes shape to choose a new Prime Minister and Cabinet. Jalil would like to keep several ministers from the el-Keib government in the new regime, particularly Minister of Defense Ousama al-Juwali.

2. According to this individual, Jalil wants to maintain a degree of security and stability in an effort to reassure foreign businesses and banks that Libya will not descend into civil war and chaos. At the same time, the NTC must deal with the regional issues that divide the country's three electoral regions: Tripolitania in the West, Cyrenaica (Barqa) in the East, and Fezzan in the South. In the weeks leading up to the election the failure of the NTC to resolve these differences has strengthened the federalist movement in Barqa while antagonizing the tribal leaders in the South. Both groups are calling on their followers to boycott the election while the Southerners are calling for the National Army to withdraw its forces from the area around the town of Kufra, where they are deployed to stop fighting between tribal militias. At the same time, on July 1 federalist supporters attacked electoral offices in Benghazi, protesting the influence of Tripoli and the Western region on the upcoming elections.

3. (Source Comment: In the opinion of a knowledgeable individual, the division of the 200 seats in the GNC lies at the heart of this matter, with 120 seats allotted for the Tripolitania, 60 for Barqa, and 18 for the Fezzan area. At present, the Libyan Muslim Brotherhood (LMB) and its political arm, the Justice and Construction Party (JCP), are attempting to mount a national campaign, receiving discreet advice and technical support from the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood (EMB). With this assistance, Jalil is convinced that the JCP is the party that operates most effectively throughout the country. Jalil has established ties to the EMB, from whom he has learned that JCP leader Mohamad Sowan and his associates are working with the leadership of the EMB.)

4. According to his sources, Jalil believes that he can work with Sowan and the LMB/JCP; however, he is concerned that Mohammed Morsi, the newly elected EMB President of Egypt, and EMB Supreme Guide Mohammed Badie are focused on developing Egyptian influence in Libya. Jalil has been informed privately that these EMB leaders want to establish a strong position in Libya, particularly in the oil services sector as part of their effort to improve Egypt's economic situation. Libyan officials in Cairo and Jalil's own associates are warning him that the Egyptians may see the NTC as a potential barrier to their effort and are advising Sowan to press for an early withdrawal of Jalil and the NTC from Libyan politics. For his part, Jalil has attempted to avoid direct conflict with the LMB/JCP, focusing his attention, and that of the el-Keib interim government on trying to deal with the unrest in the period leading up to the national elections.

5. According to a particularly sensitive source, Jalil believes that Sowan will need the assistance of the **Libyan National Party (LNP)**, the Islamist group led by religious scholar Ali al-Salabi and former Islamist militant General Abdel Hakim Amin Belhaj to gain enough seats to control the GNC. While there are significant personal conflicts between Sowan and Belhaj, Jalil believes that the two groups could work together to gain control of the government. In this case, Jalil believes the new regime would move quickly to oust the NTC, and establish a more conservative Islamist regime. At the same time, since the LNP is a Tripoli based movement, Jalil fears that the tribal federalists in Barqa might react violently to them gaining an important role in the new government. Since the Barqa leaders are urging their followers to boycott the election, a strong role for the LNP in coalition with the LMB/JCB could lead to calls for Barqa to secede from the Libya. (Source Comment: The LNP is dominated by the former leaders of the Libyan Islamic Fighting Group (Al-Jama'a al-Islamiyyah -LIFG), who, according to sensitive sources, maintained ties to al Qa'ida during their struggle with the forces of former dictator Muammar al Qaddafi.)

6. Former interim Prime Minister Mahmoud Jibril is leading the **National Forces Alliance (NFA)**, an umbrella coalition of liberal parties that received Western support for efforts to overthrow the regime of Muammar al Qaddafi. While Jibril is not on the list of candidates, his presence in the NFA leadership is seen by Belhaj and other Islamists as an effort by the United States and Western Europe to manipulate the election. Jalil does not believe that the NFA can gain control of enough seats in parliament to play a significant role in the new government. According to this source, Jalil believes that former Oil and Finance Minister Ali Tarhouni also plays an important role in the NFA.

7. At the same time, Jalil is watching the progress of a second moderate party, the National Front (NF), which is based on the work of a 1980s-era anti-Qaddafi exile organization. The party is led by Mohammed al-Magariaf, an exiled intellectual dissident leader from a prominent Eastern Libyan family. Jalil's sources advise that the NF is also backed by the al-Sennusi tribe, the former Libyan royal family, who may be looking to play a role in a semi-autonomous or independent Barqa. One particularly sensitive source noted that many of the NF leaders have ties to the United States, Italy and the United Kingdom, and at one point Jalil believed that the NF might be able to work with the NFA; however, personal differences between the leaders of the two parties made effective cooperation difficult.

8. (Source Comment: In the end, a particularly sensitive source stated in confidence that Jalil believes the LMB/JCB will have a significant role in the new government, possibly supported by the LNP. However; he points out that since accurate polling is nonexistent it is impossible to predict a victor with any accuracy. Jalil also noted that it is quite possible that no group will win a clear victory, which, when added to the boycotts and pre-election violence may require the NTC maintain control of the country for some time to come. Accordingly, he has instructed al-Juwali to prepare to use the National Army to maintain order. For his part Al-Juwali has warned that this will be a difficult task since the best units of the Army, including many of its armored forces are deployed in the Kufra region of the Southeast, in an effort to control tribal conflicts, stem the flow of weapons into the country from South Sudan, and resist Qaddafi loyalists amongst the nomadic tribes of the region.)

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