

RELEASE  
IN FULL

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**From:** H <hrod17@clintonemail.com>  
**Sent:** Tuesday, February 28, 2012 8:29 AM  
**To:** 'Russorv@state.gov'  
**Subject:** Fw: From HRC friend

Pls print.

----- Original Message -----

**From:** Sullivan, Jacob J [mailto:SullivanJJ@state.gov]  
**Sent:** Friday, February 24, 2012 05:24 AM  
**To:** H  
**Subject:** Fw: From HRC friend

Latest from Gene.

----- Original Message -----

**From:** Cretz, Gene A  
**Sent:** Friday, February 24, 2012 01:13 AM  
**To:** Sullivan, Jacob J; Feltman, Jeffrey D  
**Subject:** RE: From HRC friend

I am skeptical that Jalil and al-keeb are capable either by power or by character to deal with the shortcomings of their MinDef and Minint in this way. The latter 2 are both very powerful by virtue of their Zintan and Misrata roots respectively, and any effort to remove them would have serious blowback. MiniNt Fawzi who I saw the other day is clearly way ahead of his colleague in getting the thuwar into the process of registration, the first step hopefully toward DDR. I think everybody here is aware now how difficult the disarming of these militias, which have become de facto real institutions in and of themselves. It is naive to think they can be dissolved by executive fiat. Some positive movement- Jordanians preparing to accept first tranche of 1500 for police training.

There is concern here that continuing rivalries among the militias remains dangerous from the perspective of the havoc they can wreak with their firepower and their continued control of select turf. At the end of the day, I think everybody is coming to the conclusion that the elections will take place in the context of militia control. We hope that a program can be devised to keep them acting responsibly toward the outcome of the election, especially viz the obligations they may well be asked to undertake to keep elections free, and fair and devoid of violence. Always danger of continuing skirmishes but Armageddon predictions a bit overstated.

We are all worried about the situation in Kufra and the clashes between the Arab alZwai tribe and the African tribals the Tebu. This is again a legacy of the Qadhafi era who played on these divisions to keep himself in control. The government believes that the Tebu are being aided from al-Qadhafi elements and perhaps government supporters in Sudan to undermine the TNC. There are some disturbing signs that in fact the TNC may be supporting the dispatch of select militias to deploy down there maybe rpt maybe to "resolve" this ethnic problem as the situation in Tewarga was resolved-i.e., "ethnic cleansing" -We are only at the very beginning stages of seeing whether there is credible evidence on this score--so please rpt please don't raise any flags about it. It would be explosive. I will keep you informed about any info we develop.

No surprise about Heftar-he is extremely angry he lost out on the COS spot so his efforts to undermine the new COS Manqoosh would be fully in line with his character to be big cheese.

The war wounded is a national tragedy. The former group allowed everybody to go abroad and they did to the tune of 800 million dollars. 50,000 Libyans abroad now-15 percent receiving medical treatment. Who do you think the others are? Relatives, frauds, and those who snuck out to get botox and tummy tucks. Senator McCain will rail about our refusal to take thousands of them to the States but the process has been so bungled I think we did as much as we could considering.

-----Original Message-----

From: Sullivan, Jacob J  
Sent: Wednesday, February 22, 2012 9:11 AM  
To: Feltman, Jeffrey D; Cretz, Gene A  
Subject: From HRC friend

Here is the latest on Libya. As always, let me know your thoughts.

SOURCE:

Sources with direct access to the Libyan National Transitional Council, as well as the highest levels of European Governments, and Western Intelligence and security services.

1.

On February 19, 2012, Libyan President Mustafa Abdul Jalil and Prime Minister Abdurrahim el-Keib instructed Minister of the Interior Minister Fawzi Abd Ali and Minister of Defense Osama al Juwali to move as forcefully as possible to deal with armed conflict between the various militias which carried the bulk of fighting during the 2011 revolution against former dictator Muammar al Qaddafi.

According to an extremely sensitive source speaking in secret, el-Keib, acting in his role as the head of government, told the two ministers that, if they could not stop the fighting and disarm the militias he would be forced to find ministers who can carry out his orders.

Ali and Juwali each stated privately that, while they would follow orders, they have little hope of succeeding in this matter until el-Keib and Jalil gain credibility as the rulers of the country.

Ali added that, in his opinion, this situation will persist until a new government is chosen during the national elections planned for later in 2012.

2.

In the opinion of this individual, the Prime Minister is particularly concerned by the situation in the Southern portion of the country, where the area defined by the towns of Ghat, Sabha, and al Kufra, where fighting between rival tribal and regional militias has been exacerbated by the activities of

Qaddafi loyalists, and their allies, Taureg tribal fighters.

This individual added that el-Keib and Jalil agree that the uncertain security situation in this area represents a threat to Libya's future stability.

They agreed that, at present, if faced with a concerted effort by either disaffected militiamen or pro-Qaddafi forces government security forces and the new national army would be unable to protect either Libyan citizens or Western businessmen and oil industry workers in the region.

3. (Source Comment:

In the opinion of this individual, el-Keib believes that any attack against oil field workers will frighten large Western firms and seriously damage Libya's efforts to recover from the revolution.

This individual added that al Juwali is particularly upset with his deputy Minister and Chief of Staff of the Army, General Yousef Mangoush, who he believes has been unable to work with national army ground force commander General Khalifa Belqasim Haftar.

A very sensitive source added that the Benghazi based units of the army, under Haftar's direct command, are currently deploying to the area southeast of al-Kufra, along the Sudanese border.)

4.

In the opinion of a sensitive source, Haftar and al Juwali believe that the Sudanese military is providing arms and supplies to the pro-Qaddafi forces, under direct orders from Sudanese President Omar al Bashir.

El-Keib complained to al-Juwali that Haftar's forces passed through al-Kufra region during early and mid-February on their way to the Sudanese border, however; they did nothing to disarm the local revolutionary militias, or stop the fighting between competing tribal groups.

In the opinion of this individual, Haftar felt that the threat from the pro-Qaddafi forces was greater than that posed by the regional and tribal fighting.

5.

At the same time, a source with excellent access to the leadership of the National Transitional Council (NTC) stated in secret that fighting continues between regional, tribal, and religious rivals throughout the Northern/Mediterranean portions of the country.

This same source added that the ongoing struggle between the Misrata and Zintan militias for control of the area west of Tripoli is particularly violent and disruptive for the rest of the country.

In the capital itself, fighting continues between regional groups, the national army, Islamist militias, and criminal street gangs, all of whom are very well armed.

This individual reports that during mid-February 2012 el-Keib and Jalil agreed to address the problem of disaffected former militiamen and their families by providing payments of 2,000 Dinars (approximately \$1,500) per month to the families of fighters who were wounded or killed in the revolution.

6.

In addition the President and Prime Minister instructed Minister of Finance Hassan Zigliam to develop an efficient system to provide assistance funds to unemployed former fighters.

For his part, Zigliam privately expressed concern that previous efforts in this regard have met with a high level of fraud.

According to the government's best estimates, the revolutionary army included approximately 25,000 combat troops, but it is difficult to identify those with legitimate claims, as no accurate service records were maintained.

That said, he stated in private that the government must be seen to take some form of direct action, even if money is paid to fraudulent claimants.

The fact is, according to Zigliam, the NTC is losing control of the country and must give something to the veterans of the revolution to slow this process.

7. (Source Comment: Speaking in strictest confidence, a knowledgeable individual stated that al-Juwali is concerned by the possibility that the country may deteriorate into a multi-sided civil war involving the regional militias, Islamist forces and the national army.

At the same time, he acknowledges that the new army has lost control of large portions of the southern part of the country, with tribal fighting spilling over into Mali and Chad.

According to this source, al-Juwali is also frustrated by the slow pace of military and police training promised to the various Libyan national security forces by the governments of France and Turkey.

He added that, while Turkey has received some of the most seriously wound troops for treatment, the lack of adequate medical care for veterans inside of Libya remains a major source of conflict between the former rebel troops and the NTC government.